A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality /

A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality /

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We present a framework that clarifies the financial role of the IMF, the rationale for conditionality, and the conditions under which IMF-induced moral hazard can arise. In the model, traditional conditionality commits country authorities to undertake crisis resolution efforts, facilitating the retu...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Zettelmeyer, Jeromin
Other Authors: Jeanne, Olivier, Ostry, Jonathan D (Jonathan David), 1962-
Format: Book
Language:English
Published: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2008
Edition:1st ed
Series:IMF working paper ; WP/08/236
IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2008/236
Subjects:
International Monetary Fund > Finance
Financial crises > Prevention > Econometric models
Loans, Foreign > Econometric models
Moral hazard > Econometric models
Crisis management
Crisis prevention
Crisis resolution
Economic & financial crises & disasters
Economics
Finance
Finance: General
Financial Crises
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Financial Risk Management
Financial crises
Financial risk management
General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation
Moral hazard
Political Economy
Political economy
Peru
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