Investigating corruption /

Investigating corruption /

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Why incentive contracts and independent investigations may not be the perfect solution to the problem of bureaucratic corruption

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	Prendergast, Canice
Corporate Author:	World Bank Development Research Group. Public Economics
Format:	Book
Language:	English
Published:	Washington, DC : World Bank, Development Research Group, Public Economics, [2000]
Series:	Policy research working papers ; 2500
Subjects:	Bribery > Prevention > Econometric models Political corruption > Prevention > Econometric models Public administration > Corrupt practices > Prevention > Econometric models Bribery > Prevention Political corruption > Prevention Public administration > Corrupt practices > Prevention
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University of Chicago

Holdings details from University of Chicago
Call Number:	HG3879.P6 no.2500

Cornell University

Holdings details from Cornell University
Call Number:	Oversize JF1081 .P74z 2000 +

Princeton University

Holdings details from Princeton University
Call Number:	HG3881.5.W57 P63 no.2500